Fall of Singapore: The Real Reasons
Allied Surrender Party (with escort), Ford Factory, Bukit Timah, Singapore
In a report by British General Wavell to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1942, Australian soldiers were singled out for criticism of their actions in the Fall of Singapore. A criticism that led London Newspapers to write “Australian cowardice led to the fall of Singapore”. But a closer look reveals where the real responsibility for the Fall of Singapore lies. But firstly, to understand why Singapore fell, it is important to understand why Singapore became “Fortress Singapore”.
During WWI, the Japanese allied themselves with the Russians, French and British. But Japan’s ambitions worried the British. The “Singapore Strategy” was developed by the British whereby a major naval base would be built in Singapore from which the Royal Navy could send a ‘significant fleet’ to intercept any Japanese expansion in the region. This fleet would not be based in Singapore but would be sent to Singapore should it be needed. Also, a large garrison would be permanently based in Singapore to act as a deterrent for any would-be aggressor until such time as this ‘significant fleet’ arrived.
After WWI, realising the importance of navies, an arms race developed between the United States (US), Britain and Japan. In 1922, the “Washington Naval Treaty” (Washington Treaty) was signed by the three nations as well as France and Italy, to limit the number of battleships and battle cruisers of each nation.
HMS Prince of Wales
In 1924, Winston Churchill became the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. In setting budget priorities, Churchill made deep cuts to the Royal Navy confident that the US’s involvement in the Washington Treaty would help keep Japan in check. Consequently, the Royal Navy’s number of ships reduced and plans for the upgrade of fortifications and construction of the naval base in Singapore were postponed. Churchill was quoted as saying, “Why should there be a war with Japan? The Japanese are our allies. I do not believe there is the slightest chance of war [with Japan] in our lifetime.” Words that would come back to haunt him. Subsequent British Governments allocated funds for the development of the fortifications and the naval base in Singapore, but these were ad hoc and insufficient. In fact, the completion of the 15” naval gun batteries on Singapore, was achieved only after a substantial donation by the Sultan of Johore.
When WWII began, with an ageing and smaller fleet size, the Royal Navy became pre-occupied with the war in the Atlantic Ocean. But the situation on Malay Peninsula was becoming more critical. As a token ‘significant fleet’, Churchill (now Prime Minister) decided to send two warships (the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse) to Singapore along with four destroyers and an aircraft carrier (HMS Indomitable) to provide air cover for the fleet. Unfortunately, the aircraft carrier ran aground in the West Indies and was unable to join the fleet.
Japanese light tank
On the 8th December 1941, Japanese troops invaded northern Malaya. On the same day, the Japanese also attacked the British colony of Hong Kong, the US naval base at Pearl Harbour (7th December Hawaii time) and US bases in the Philippines. As a result, the US was not able to come to the aid of the British as originally hoped by Churchill. Without air cover, the Prince of Wales and Repulse sailed to intercept the Japanese landing. But, on the 10th December, precision Japanese bombers and torpedo planes sank both ships. So ended any chance of the Singapore Strategy succeeding.
There were many other aspects that contributed to the Fall of Singapore:
1) Pre-war fortifications in the north of Singapore were neglected. A review in 1927 noted that the location of possible enemy airfields given that aircraft range was limited combined with the poor road system in Malaya, deemed that a land-based attack on Singapore was extremely unlikely. In 1937, Colonel Arthur Percival (later Lieutenant- General, GOC Malaya), carried out a review on Singapore defences. He identified the greatly improved range of aircraft and improvement of the road system on the west coast of Malaya. His report noted that it was more likely that an attack on Singapore would come from the land side and not from the sea as originally expected. Unfortunately, this report was largely ignored by the British War Office back in London and no meaningful fixed defences were built in the north of Singapore. It must be noted that when Percival became GOC Malaya in 1941, he did nothing to improve Singapore’s northern defences claiming that construction of fixed defences would be ‘bad for morale’.
2) British pre-war counter-intelligence against the Japanese was ineffective. In fact, Japan had developed a network of sympathetic locals to provide information on the allies which gave the Japanese significant intelligence advantages in the Malayan and Singapore battles.
Allied 15” land-based naval gun
3) The British India Army comprised more than 50% of the infantry forces on the Malay Peninsula. The soldiers were young, inexperienced and poorly trained volunteers. Experienced officers and NCO’s were transferred to fight in the war in the Mediterranean and Egypt, leaving the Indian forces in Malaya, vulnerable to poor leadership. Something that the Japanese exploited.
4) The use of outdated aircraft and then their withdrawal allowed complete air superiority by the Japanese. Churchill decided that the campaign in Egypt had the greater priority and diverted vital resources there.
5) The British-led Allied High Command in Singapore had assessed the use of tanks in jungle conditions as being ineffective. Churchill and the British War Cabinet then authorised the transfer of all 350 tanks from Malaya to Russia as an act of good faith after Germany started its invasion of Russia. These tanks although outdated would have been more than a match for the light-weight tanks that were used so effectively by the Japanese in the Malaya.
6) The army had the task of protecting all military assets such as airfields, depots and bases. However, rivalry particularly between the Royal Air Force and army and a lack of communication, resulted in airfields being constructed in Malaya in such places that were hard to supply and to protect.
Japanese soldiers cross a partially reconstructed Causeway to Singapore
7) The coastal defence batteries were located and designed for use against seaward targets. Most guns could be turned to face inland not just out to sea. However, they had little effect as poor communications made observation of fire difficult, the field of view inland was limited and the ammunition was armour piercing, designed for attacking ships and not suitable for land-based targets.
8) Percival incorrectly assessed that the Japanese would attack from the north-east of Singapore. Contrary to advice from his superior (General Wavell), Percival placed the fresh, full-strength British 18th Division in that area. The Japanese made their attack from the north-west where the weakened Australian 8th Division was located. Even after the Japanese had landed, Percival refused to accept that this was the Japanese invasion force and held back valuable reinforcements until it was too late.
9) Demolition of the causeway between Johore (Malaya) and Singapore was not properly carried out despite the time available to prepare. At low tide, the depth of the water was only about four feet allowing the opportunity for Japanese soldiers to wade across.
Others such as the incident involving Captain Patrick Heenan (the Traitor of Singapore), the disharmony between the senior generals of the Allied High Command and the use of untrained Australian and British soldiers to bolster numbers on Singapore, also contributed to the Fall of Singapore.
Churchill failed to realise (or refused to accept) the seriousness of the situation on the Malay Peninsula, probably still expecting the US to give assistance if the situation required. Certainly, he was pre-occupied with the war closer to home. But when Singapore fell, it was a shock to him calling it the “worst disaster” and “greatest capitulation” in British military history. But it was inevitable that Singapore would fall and the foundation for this started in 1924.
Kranji War Cemetery & Singapore Memorial (Click to enlarge)
The motivation of those who compiled the Wavell Report which made the criticisms of Australia, can now be seen as an effort to deflect attention from the strategic blunders of British Government (Churchill, in particular), its military establishment in London (the War Office) and its field commanders (the British-led Allied High Command in Singapore and Wavell himself).
It is a pity that so many men, women (both military and civilian) and children suffered and died as a result. Let them rest in peace!! Lest we Forget.