Fall of Singapore: Australia, a Scapegoat
Kranji War Cemetery (looking towards the Singapore Memorial)
General Sir Archibald Wavell
In February 1942, when UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill received word that Singapore had fallen to the Japanese, he called it the “worst disaster” and “greatest capitulation” in British military history. In June of the same year, British General Sir Archibald Wavell provided a secret report (Wavell Report) to Churchill, on the Fall of Singapore. Wavell was regional commander in the Far East which included Malaya (and Singapore) and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival who was the General Officer Commanding Malaya, was subordinate to Wavell.
Declassified on the 1st January 1993, after a 50 year suppression under the UK Secrets Act, the Wavell Report made scathing allegations against Australian soldiers on Singapore Island leading up to the Fall of Singapore. Allegations that included desertion, indiscipline and failure to send out required patrols.
London newspapers interpreted the Wavell Report a little more harshly. They reported that the “loss of Singapore was primarily due failures by Australian forces”. Provocative headlines were published like “Australian cowardice led to the fall of Singapore” citing “Australian troops deserted, raped, looted and even murdered during their retreat in the face of the Japanese advance”. Back in Australia, the RSL angrily refuted the London newspapers claims and the Australian Parliament authorised its own report (“The 1942 Singapore disaster: assessing recent claims”) (Australian Report) in an attempt to place on record, a balanced appraisal into Australia’s conduct during the Fall of Singapore.
Australian soldiers arriving in Malaya
There was evidence that some allied soldiers broke under pressure and ran from the battlefield. Groups of soldiers, including Australians, often drunk, were found roaming the streets and looting. In a few cases, it is reported that unidentified soldiers forced women and children off ships at gunpoint to take their places themselves. Other claims seem to be based more on hearsay and not evidence. The British-led Allied High Command received a report that about 2,000 Australian soldiers were loose in Singapore. A Staff Captain of the 22nd Australian Brigade was sent to round up these men and return them to their units. However, he could only find a few Australians. But after a check, Australian unit numbers were verified. It was clear at the time, that the original report made to the Allied High Command, was exaggerated. It should be noted that there was no effort on the part of the British to round up its men.
The Australian Official History on the Fall of Singapore, does not provide a detailed account of desertions but only that some Australians deserted during combat. However, the British Official History provides an interesting comment. It notes that the Australian 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion was the only unit that was at full strength. After sustaining many losses while fighting on the Malay Peninsula, the remainder of the 8th Division’s numbers were boosted with untrained reinforcements. In fact, it was observed that in the 2/29th Battalion which had suffered substantial losses, a great number of men had not fired a rifle and about 200 had not been trained to use a bayonet.
Australians manning a ‘2 pounder’ on the shores of the Strait of Johore overlooking the Causeway and the Sultan of Johore’s palace
The Australian Report adds that ‘it is unfair to criticise untrained troops for poor performance’ [desertion and indiscipline]. It goes on to add ‘if well trained and properly led troops run away from a defensible position, that may be cowardice; if untrained soldiers in an obviously hopeless position, crack and run when attacked [by overwhelming enemy numbers] after heavy bombardment, they cannot be blamed’.
The accusation of ‘failure to send out patrols’ had no basis. In the Wavell Report, it was acknowledged that one patrol was sent out on the night of the 8th February 1942, the very night that the Japanese invasion of Singapore Island started. The Australian Official History lists several nights when patrols had occurred in the week prior to the night of the invasion. Either the reports on these patrols did not make it to the Allied High Command, or they were simply ignored. (It must be noted that at the time, the Allied High Command was convinced that the Japanese invasion would come from the north-east side of Singapore and not the north-west where the Australians were located.)
It is clear that some instances of desertion occurred. But most Australian soldiers, as with most other allied soldiers, conducted themselves with courage and discipline throughout the Malayan and Singapore campaigns. It should be noted that the Australian 8th Division suffered 73% of the allied casualties but only comprised 13% of the allied forces. The action of senior Australian and British military officers to place untrained soldiers at the front line, also bears greater scrutiny.
Australian POW’s
It is unreasonable to allow the possibility of a few to brand all Australian soldiers in the Fall of Singapore. It then falls back on the British officers who compiled the Wavell Report, as to their motive in blaming Australia. A report that was endorsed by Wavell himself as being ‘fair and accurate’. Perhaps the last word on this should be given to the RSL at the time of the London newspaper claims, “the people [British Officers] who were making these reports were doing so to cover their own backsides”.
Blog Source:
https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1993/93bp01.pdf
Brune, P. (2014). Descent into Hell. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp.432-433